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XJAOQUN Xu, TRIAL OF MODERNITY: JUDICIAL REFORM IN EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA, 1901-1937 (Stanford University Press, 2008)

Reviewed by Nicholas Calcina Howson *
In September 2008, Beijing-based legal historian and public intellectual Professor He Weifang issued two broadsides in the pages of
China's relentlessly independent newspaper Nanfang Zhoumou
(Southern Weekend) attacking a disturbing trend in official framing
of China's judicial system. In these passionate essays he engaged directly with the rhetoric emanating from the PRC Supreme People's
Court starting in the winter of 2007. That perhaps counter-intuitive
rhetoric called for a "judiciary that serves the people" and decried
"the alienation of the people from the judiciary," "loss of control by
the people over the judiciary," and a judicial power neither "clean"
nor "fair" but instead concerned only about "protecting its own interest." The solution proposed looked to "the unceasing struggle to
rupture the monopoly of the judges clique over the judicial power,
and use [ofl all kinds of democratic procedural methods to allow effective control over the judiciary by the people."' Or, in the words of the
top official of the Supreme People's Court, President Wang Shengjun,
at an August 2008 study session for higher-level judges from across
the nation:
We must make the distance between the courts and the people/masses smaller, and not greater. We must fully rectify
the alienation of the judiciary from the masses, and with our
heads held high and in a forthright style truly embody a judiciary "for the people".

. .

. We are to emphasize acting in

accordance with law, an objective and disinterested approach, and respect for the law, yet we cannot look on the
masses with a cold eye, or engage in mystification, and we
should act in a way that the masses find easy to accept, using the language of the masses in answering and handling
problems-so as to allow the masses to understand clearly,2
listen with understanding, and understand in their hearts.
In very broad strokes, the Supreme People's Court-or more accurately the Communist Party which directs it-has in this way been
seeking to temper any inclination towards greater independence or
autonomy by China's developing court system, and to re-assert so* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See He Weifang, Sifa Gaige de Nanti Yu Chulu ("Difficulties and the Way Out
for Judicial Reform"), Nanfang Zhoumou (Southern Weekend), Sept. 17, 2008: E31,
quoting Professor He Bing, Nanfang Dushi Bao, Nov. 3, 2007.
2. See He Weifang, Sifa Shenmihua Gai Ru He Quchu ("The Way in Which We
Should Eliminate Mystification of the Judicial Function"), Nanfang Zhoumou (Southern Weekend), Sept. 25, 2008: E30, quoting Wang Shengjun, Sifa Bu Yao Gao
Shenmihua ("We Should Not Mystify The Judicial Power"), Renmin Ribao (People's
Daily), Aug. 28, 2008.
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called "democratic" or "mass line" principles in the functioning of the
modern People's Courts. He Weifang, in the same fashion as other
engaged lawyers and public intellectuals, 3 responded with immense
feeling and coherence to promote a judiciary characterized instead by
professional autonomy, technical competence (even if a little "mystifying" to the consumers of the judicial system), predictability and
objectivity. Only a judiciary operating in this fashion, he said, can
constitute the institutional basis for protection of a real "democratic"
system via fair, consistent, and independent application of the lawthe presumed product of a representative legislative
function-in the
4
aspired-to "rule of law state" (fazhi guojia).
Observing these significant legal-political debates in the Chinese
press and academy in the first decade of the twenty-first century, we
might think they concern battles started only in the last decade and a
half of Reform-era China. Now Professor Xu Xiaoqun reminds us that
these struggles have a much longer pedigree, stretching back to the
end of the nineteenth century and China's first fraught encounter
with "the West" and one idea of "modernity." Further developing his6
own work, 5 as well as the prior scholarship of Alison Conner,
Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip Huang, 7 and others, Xu describes in
great detail attempts at judicial "reform" and "modernization" in the
critical late Qing and early Republican period of 1901-1937. Why
"critical?" Because this is the period when China's last imperial dynasty fell and a new governance system was mooted, and when China
attempted the creation of political and legal institutions to underpin
a "modern" and democratic polity under some notion of the "rule of
law." In his personal introduction, Xu points to the importance of that
prior effort at legal construction for today's struggle in contemporary
China, noting correctly that "[t]he project of striving for judicial modernity in Republican China and its ramifications offer clues to, and
help an understanding of, the achievements and limitations in the
similar project in post-Mao China, since many parallels between the
two can be found" (p. xii). How very true, and vital, this introductory
comment seems when we compare He Weifang's and Xiao Han's arguments on judicial independence, uttered in 2008, and the first
Republican Minister of Justice's articulated reform aims from 1912:
"Judicial independence is the key element of a constitutional state
and the spirit of a country based on the rule of law; yet judicial inde3.
Rights
4.
5.

See, e.g., Xiao Han, Qunti Peichang: Quanyi Yu Jiuan ("Mass Compensation:
and Stability"), 222 Caijing Magazine, Oct. 13, 2008, 152-53.
See He, supra note 1, and He, supra note 2.
See Xiaoqun Xu, The Fate of Judicial Independence in Republican China,

1912-1937, 149

CHINA QUARTERLY 1 (1997); XIAOQUN XU, CHINESE PROFESSIONALS AND
THE REPUBLICAN STATE: THE RISE OF PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS IN SHANGHAI 1912-

1937 (2001).
6. See Alison W. Conner, Lawyers and the Legal Profession During the Republican Period, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 215 (Kathryn Bernhardt &

Philip C.C. Huang eds., 1994).
7. See CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra note 6; PHILIP.C.C.
HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC

COMPARED (2001).
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pendence can stand only after complete institutions are built" (p. 59).
In effect, and perhaps rather sadly, the conversation in the near-century between 1912 and 2008 has changed very little-and it is that
conversation which Xu Xiaoqun unpacks with immense skill in this
minutely-researched new book.
The first third of Professor Xu's book is a summary of the formal,
national, project of judicial reform in the period between 1900 and
1937, that phase of Chinese history which saw the fall of the Qing
dynasty, the short-lived Republic, the Beiyang Government under
Yuan Shikai, the descent into warlord chaos, and the partial unification of major parts of China under Guomingdang Party rule after
1927-8 and the "Northern Expedition" and "White Terror" led by Chiang Kai-shek. A good deal of this treatment follows Philip Huang s
and other legal scholars and historians who have looked at this transitional period-in which civil and criminal codes used in the
supposedly post-imperial era were actually the statutory product of
last-gasp legal reform from the dying days of the Qing dynasty, and
many poor and rather isolated counties continued with imperial-era
institutions such as a local magistrate-like figure who combined administrative, fiscal, judicial, penal, state monopoly and
infrastructure development functions.
The remainder of the book is rooted in Professor Xu's own recent
research, and thus focuses on judicial institutions and practice at the
county level in China's Jiangsu Province, the coastal area surrounding Shanghai and, with neighboring Zhejiang, a cradle of intellectual
and material culture in second millennium CE China. The choice of
Jiangsu Province is one of both the book's strengths and its weaknesses, and for exactly the same reason. As Xu says, "Jiangsu has
been chosen because it was one of the politically more stable and economically more developed provinces, especially during the Nanjing
decade" (p. 116). This is "good" because there is clearly abundant data
and documentation from the 1920s and 1930s about this rich province adjacent to then-booming Shanghai and constituting a large part
of the Yangtze River Delta, an area which had the relative luxury of
being able to establish the full chain of judicial institutions called for
in the formal designs of the time, and staffing them with qualified
personnel, etc. This is "bad" because Jiangsu must be seen as utterly
unrepresentative of how judicial reform was rolled out, or not, in
many other areas of China-whether Peking, suddenly deprived of
its capital city status; the depths of Sichuan Province; or similarly
coastal areas like Shandong Province that were much poorer and
where the national government exercised only an attenuated writ or
influence. (Xu addresses this concern by noting that the Qing government created the Province of Jiangsu to include the poorer areas
north of the Yangtze River so as to balance the richer areas south of
the River, thereby providing Xu with a more diverse focus of study (p.
117).) Nonetheless, if we understand the limitations of a Jiangsu
8. HUANG, supra note 7.
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Province focus, it is a superb place to investigate judicial reform and
practice right down to the county level, as Professor Xu so ably does.
Professor Xu's book on China from 1900-1937 adopts a framework similar to that used by Vivienne Shue in her attempt to
understand China between 1949 and 1988, in an inquiry on what she
called "the reach of the state."9 Xu focuses on early twentieth century
China, examining (i) the reach of the central government into provincial and county levels within the "state" system, and (ii) the reach of
the "state" itself, via provincial and county level agencies, into "local
society." This focus, and data from Jiangsu, allow the author to really
pick through county-level judicial functions, defined broadly to include the judicial, police and enforcement functions of non-state
actors such as the local gentry and elites, the chambers of commerce,
scribes (plaint-writers, not "professional" lawyers), and-after
1928-Guomindang'° political cadres. He also describes power and
influence going in the opposite direction, from the county gentry/local
elite level to the nominally superior provincial and even central government authorities (when judicial functions affected their vital
interests).
Trial of Modernity contains a wealth of both surprising and eternally interesting information and analysis. One surprise is Xu's
strong demonstration of the corrosive effect the Guomindang had on
the Chinese judiciary after 1927. Their policy of "Partyizingthe judiciary" (under the broader constitutional structure of "ruling the
country through the Party") is shown to have had a profoundly negative impact on the idea and practice of autonomous or independent
judicial power, and to have been implemented in a fashion which
makes later Communist Party policy orientations seem rather halfhearted. This hampering of the judiciary was only a part of the
Guomindang's "corporatist," in fact entirely "totalitarian," idea of
governance (which took a good deal from the Italian and then German Fascists in the same period, and with the same effect as on their
respective judiciaries). It is expressed in many examples in Professor
Xu's book, including that Party's relatively decreased funding of provincial (and by implication county) judicial institutions, the use of the
courts to punish political or "anti-Party" crimes, the placing of the
Party and its cadres "above the law" (and the new courts), and the
deprivation of due process and evisceration of the courts in the context of "anti-Bandit" campaigns-which once again make the similar
Chinese Communist "Strike Hard" (or Yan Da) campaign of 1983, undertaken at the beginning of a subsequent judicial reform effort, look
watered down. A second surprise comes when Professor Xu demonstrates that the oft-dismissed Beiyang Government under former
9. VIVIENNE SHUE, THE REACH OF THE STATE: SKETCHES OF THE CHINESE BODY
POLITIC (1988).

10. This is the Chinese pinyin transliteration term for the Nationalist Party eventually led by Chiang Kai-shek, which developed in a different direction from the
immediately post-imperial Nationalist Party created by Sun Yat-sen and Song
Jiaoren out of the "Revolutionary Alliance." The Party in its post-1928 iteration is also
known in English as the "Koumintang," the "KMT," or simply the "Nationalists."
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Qing general and imperial Governor Yuan Shikai deserves a more
complex evaluation. Certainly in 1914 that government dismantled
early judicial institutions that had been set up at the county level in
the initial Republic phase (1911-1912); yet that same government
also proved a tough defender of judicial independence and the shallow roots of a functioning constitutional law system. For instance, the
Yuan regime nurtured the establishment of an administrative review
court (the pingzheng yuan), allowing citizens to sue the government.
It took the Guomindang until 1933 to establish a similar judicial
function, and that later iteration was deprived of the power to actually punish delinquent officials, a power owned-and used-by its
1914 counterpart (pp. 99-100). Xu shows convincingly that the muchanalyzed Communist Party line on the Chinese judiciary is not necessarily determined by a Chinese tradition, or even a Chinese imperial
tradition, but is certainly a style designed and implemented in the
post-1928 Guomindang-built one-Party rule tradition.
The book provides a narrative and an analysis that are not just
surprising, but deeply revealing. Professor Xu elaborates on the longunderstood insight of Philip Huang and other modern China historians in describing how the earliest "Republican" judicial institutions
were actually throw-backs to the end of the Qing "New Policy" (xin
zheng) reforms and even before. Thus, in many regions the Chinese
government was forced to implement institutions with a decidedly
"imperial" bent, or which enlisted the social power of existing local
functions. At the same time, the author shows where the real battle
on judicial reform was in 1912, as it is in 2009-the attempt to separate the judicial and administration functions of the single imperialera magistrate, and, once a stand-alone judicial function was created,
to separate the state's interest in judicial administration from the judiciary's interest and function in adjudication. (This is one aspect of
what remains at issue in the modern PRC, described as the "unhooking" of the legal profession from state judicial bureaus.) And
Professor Xu is very fair in his recitation of the data, demonstrating
how on occasion the judicial administrative side was absolutely justified in intervening in adjudication or police work-for instance, in
stopping torture of civil and criminal defendants by county-level magistrate-type figures in 1929 (p. 206). The author also fully unpacks
the age-old theme in China of variation and discord between "central"
(national) and "local" (including the power of "local elites," not just
local state institutions), and shows the immense difficulty nationallevel imperatives had in penetrating a local-level socio-political context which, like history itself, seemed like another country. Part of
that problem was clearly tied to the lack of funding for local-level institutions, where judicial reform efforts led to rapidly accelerating
expenses, and the only source of revenues became plaint fees and
bribery, an invitation to corruption of the judicial power. The lack of
money also meant that many policies and practices announced or just
desired in national theory/policy-from appeals to proper prisonscould not be implemented in reality at the base level. Xu's very good
point here is that the failure to create independent and autonomous
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judicial institutions in early Republican China was not necessarily
"political," or an effort by the state or any Party to minimize the
power of an independent judiciary, but instead largely "economic"
and directly related to the limited resources available. The negative
implication of course is that, after the rise of the one-Party state
under the Guomindang, the injury done to the Chinese judiciary was
indeed political, and part of a unified and pernicious plan for the entirely politicized state.
Professor Xu makes two other deeply interesting points. The first
is that judicial independence as implemented often led not to social
harmony and pacification, but instead to local unrest. This was because local elites felt directly challenged by national, provincial or
just "external" institutions that sought to penetrate their jurisdiction,
using instruments-the "law" and formal legal institutions-about
which the local elites were fully ignorant. The second interesting aspect is the fact that the PRC's "Strike Hard"-type campaign of 1983
and its criminalization of the Falungong sect, which have done so
much to eviscerate judicial autonomy and the coherent application of
(criminal) law, are actually contrary to imperial-era notions informing application of the dynastic penal codes. Such campaigns really
only started-and were "legalized"-with the Beiyang Government's
"Law on Punishing Robbers and Bandits" of June 1914 and the
Guomindang's "Provisional Regulations on Punishing Robbers and
Bandits" of November 1927 (pp. 283-88). While Professor Xu may
oversell slightly the imperial-era differences, 1 1 he is certainly correct
in noting that Republican-era state establishments inaugurated the
open and self-proclaimed use of such damaging initiatives in earnest.
As implied by the foregoing, Professor Xu is at his best, and his
book is marvelously valuable, when he culls through and analyzes
primary sources, including archives describing the reality of judicial
practice at the county level, and in particular the counties in Jiangsu
Province where he has had access to archival material. On the other
hand, he sometimes falls short when apparently relying too heavily
on secondary sources, especially when trying to describe the elitelevel discourse about rule of law, constitutional government, and judicial reform in China at the time. For instance, at one point he cites
Liang Qichao's October 1910 comments on "rule of law," saying Liang's comments "helped start a discourse on the rule of law among
educated Chinese" (p. 31). However, he cites not Liang's own writings, but a secondary treatment of Liang Qichao's thought, 12 without
a page number. That writing, we can only guess, must have invoked
Liang's huge 102-page essay "Zhongguo Guohui Zhidu Si Yi" ("A Personal View of China's Parliamentary System"), published in Tokyo in
the fall of 1910, in which Liang really focuses not on "rule of law" but
11. See PHILIP A. KUHN, SOULSTEALERS: THE CHINESE SORCERY SCARE OF 1768
(1990).
12. Cheng Liaoyuan, Qingmo de Fazhi Huayu (The Rule of Law Discourse in the
Late Qing), in ZHONGXI FALo

(2002) (cited at p. 31).
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on a very different notion of parliamentary democracy and parliamentary sovereignty-i.e., the absolute primacy of "law" or
legislation promulgated by a sovereign representative assembly, certainly over the Emperor, but also over any kind of human or civil
rights granted in a written constitution, or later "natural rights."
This is a significant defect in Xu's otherwise cogent and well-informed introductory argument, as Liang's thinking at that stage
served to the detriment of powerful or autonomous judicial institutions. (In a related puzzle, the reader wonders why Xu lists as
"primary sources" a number of modern Chinese-language secondary
sources, such as a potted 1994 Qing legal history by China's dean of
Qing legal historians, Professor Zhang Jinfan. Certainly a standard
history written fewer than twenty years ago in the PRC, probably by
a committee under the esteemed Professor Zhang, is not a primary
source?) If Xu was to rely so much on secondary sources to frame the
intellectual, policy-maker, state and Party discourse on rule of law,
institutional establishments, and "rights" generally, he might have
done better to rely on Marina Svensson's encyclopedic and nuanced
2002 treatment 13 (which Xu includes in his bibliography but does not
use enough). The reader also wishes that, in terms of substantive focus, Professor Xu spent less time describing and analyzing the formal
prison system, which really should be separated from an inquiry on
judicial reform and independence (noting here that China did not
generally have prisons in the imperial era, but only magistrates'
holding cells for the subjects of current proceedings, whence individuals would receive their punishment or depart for exile, etc.). Lastly,
the reader yearns for an even fuller understanding of the educational, socio-economic, and experiential backgrounds of the nationalto-local figures who were involved in judicial reform. This is something Andy Nathan brings off beautifully in his 1976 book on the
failure of "constitutionalism" in late imperial and early Republican
Peking, and does more than anything else to inform analysts about
the choices reformers and resisters made in those difficult years of
14
wholesale governance change.
Professor Xu's fascinating and relevant story gives rise to a host
of important questions. First and foremost is the notion of judicial
system and legal "modernity" and/or "reform." What precisely is it? Is
modernity captured and expressed in the qualifications of policymaking or institution-building personnel, or is it rooted in the equally
difficult-to-evaluate ideas of independence, autonomy, competence,
predictability/standardization, or is it simply being-or not beinglike "the West"? Second, what was the key, and most effective, force
behind judicial modernization and legal reform in China, and what
might animate the same efforts today-is it external (in China's case
in the twentieth century, the Western powers and their promise to
13. MARINA SVENSSON, DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: A CONCEPTUAL AND
POLITICAL HISTORY (2002).
14. ANDREW J. NATHAN, PEKING POLITICS 1918-1923: FACTIONALISM AND THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (1976).
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end "extraterritoriality"), internal (the Chinese state or ruling political force), or something wrought by indigenous technical experts?
Does the identity of the key force working for reform and modernization, however construed, affect the success of the modernization effort
itself? How best is the judicial modernization program sold to the ultimate consumers of the system, the governed citizenry? Professor Xu
has done an excellent job in conjuring these questions, and also moving partway to a set of answers which are very useful in the twentyfirst century analysis of the same set of problems. Perhaps better
still, Xu outlines a self-defeating dynamic about judicial and state
modernization itself-what he accurately calls the "paradox of modernity." For he convincingly demonstrates how expansion of the
state and its institutions creates significant expectations for those
who are governed and nominally protected by the state system, and
those who would work the system (legal professionals). (This can be
seen at work, with respect to the PRC, in the heart-breaking 2005
Investigative Report on China's Peasants by the husband and wife
team of Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao. In countless incidents of local
oppression, rape, physical intimidation, corruption, and bullying at
the hands of local state or Party actors in Anhui Province backwaters, the victims resort initially to the formal court system, even
though many of them know that the local People's Court is an instrument of the same absolute power which oppresses them so
completely. 15) In the event, many of these expectations cannot be
met, even partially, which in turn redounds to the detriment of the
modernization project itself. And Xu shows how modernization, even
without the failure to meet expectations engendered, can have detrimental if unintended consequences-which range from inefficient
(compared to pre-modernization) case disposition, to the empowering
of local tyrants who appropriate new judicial structures as an instrument of power, to stymieing the effective use of the police power
against individuals who are out of society (criminal gangs, "bandits,"
etc.). In each case, the yearning for "modernity," and the implementation of modernization programs, contain within themselves the seeds
of their own frustration and stubborn reversal.
The question of judicial independence in China during the period
1901-1937 raises a final irony for non-Chinese readers of Xu's book.
As Xu notes repeatedly, and correctly, a good deal of the impetus for
judicial and legal reform in post-Qing China came from Chinese efforts to lift the burden of "extraterritoriality" employed by foreign
powers after the Opium Wars and pursuant to the Qing-era compacts
universally known in Chinese as the "Unequal Treaties" (bu
pingdeng tiaoyue). Each time a post-Qing government tried to abolish
the system so harmful to China's sovereignty and self-conception,
China was informed that its various systems of governance-from
15. CHEN GUIDI & WU CHUNTAO, ZHONGGUO NONGMIN DIAOCHAO BAO (INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON CHINA'S PEASANTS) (2005), available in English as CHEN GUIDI & WU
CHUNTAO, WILL THE BOAT SINK THE WATER?: THE LIFE OF CHINA'S PEASANTS

Hong trans. 2006).

(Zhu
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the legal and judicial system to the company law system-had to be
"modernized" or made to resemble more closely idealized Western
systems. Yet, the Western powers and Japan for many years refused
to eliminate extraterritoriality because, in the words of a 1929 U.S.
State Department note replying to the newly-established
Guomindang government's request for abolition of the same, "[t]here
does not exist in China today a system of independent Chinese courts
free from extraneous influence" (p. 82). One well-known judicial figure at the end of this period was John C.H. Wu (Wu Jingxiong).
Surprisingly, Professor Xu does not invoke John Wu even though Wu
was appointed by the Jiangsu Provincial Government to sit as a judge
on the new "Shanghai Provisional Court" in 1927-a court with jurisdiction over all controversies in the Shanghai International
Settlement, except those cases where the defendants were citizens of
the Treaty nations 16 -and was later promoted to Chief Justice and
then President of the same Court. Wu was in fact a well-known twentieth-century Chinese-origin legal scholar, lawyer, judge and law
school dean, who engaged in a decade-long correspondence with Justice Holmes and composed the June 1933 draft of a Chinese
Constitution which formed the basis of that nation's first Constitution in 1947. One chapter of his 1951 "spiritual autobiography"7
Beyond East and West has the grandiose title "Law is My Idol."'
That title comes from a story John Wu loved to tell about his personal
role in standing up for "judicial independence" in 1930s China-independence not from Chinese government or Party political pressure,
but from the same foreign powers who constantly asserted that
China's judicial institutions actors lacked the independence sufficient
to permit the end of the Treaty Port system. John Wu recounts the
genesis of the title, and his heroic role, in the following lovely fashion:
In the summer of 1929, I tried the famous "Roulette Case"
which stirred the whole population of Shanghai .... I will
only reproduce an editorial from the British paper, the North
China Daily News, on one of my remarks during the proceedings. The attorney for the defence, Dr. Fischer, had said that
if I should be too severe with the foreigners, it would delay or
impede the rendition of extraterritoriality. This argument
sounded a bit too political to my judicial ears. My answer is
embodied in the editorial: "JUDGE JOHN WU ON LAW
THE IDOL... [Olne cannot ignore a remark of Judge John
Wu . .. Commenting upon certain remarks of Dr. Fischer,
Judge Wu said: 'However, the facts you have outlined in
your application may be taken into consideration as mitigating circumstances when the second charge is tried, but in my
opinion your arguments, political arguments, if I may say so,
are neither appropriate nor relevant. Law is the only idol of
this court, not the rendition or abolition of extraterritorial16. As he exulted to Justice Holmes in a letter at that time, "I shall try to Holmesianize the Law of China!" JoHN C.H. Wu, BEYOND EAST AND WEST 113 (1951).
17. Id. at 107.
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ity. I would rather do justice and by so doing constitute an
obstacle to the rendition or abolition of extraterritoriality
than perpetrate a miscarriage of justice which might expedite or favour the abolition of extraterritoriality."'" 8
How deeply ironic, and yet deeply satisfying, to see a Chinese
judge, a graduate of Shanghai's (American Methodist-established)
Soochow Comparative Law School (1920) and the Michigan Law
School (1921), and longtime correspondent of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
throw back into the faces of the hectoring Western nations their
heady idea of judicial independence. As Xu Xiaoqun demonstrates
with such aplomb in his new book, this winning notion was a bedrock
orientation perhaps forced by the Western powers, and certainly
modeled on Western templates, but keenly desired by many purely
indigenous actors intent on some identity of the "rule of law" in
China. Between 1912 and 1937 judicial independence may indeed
have been implemented at the behest of the Western nations as the
price for removing "extraterritoriality"-but that independence was
then, as it is in 2009, something transparently desired by the Chinese
people as they work out their own legal, governance and political culture and institutions.

18. Id. at 118-19.

